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ABSTRACT Social networks (SNs) have become a powerful tool for the jihadism as they serve as recruitment
assets, live forums, psychological warfare, as well as sharing platforms. SNs enable vulnerable individuals
to reach radicalized people, hence triggering their own radicalization process. There are many vulnerability
factors linked to socio-economic and demographic conditions that make jihadist militants suitable targets for
their radicalization. We focus on these vulnerability factors, studying, understanding, and identifying them
on the Internet. Here, we present a set of radicalization indicators and a model to assess them using a data
set of tweets published by several Islamic State of Iraq and Sham sympathizers. Results show that there is a
strong correlation between the values assigned by the model to the indicators.
INDEX TERMS Terrorism, radicalisation, indicator, metric, risk factor, social network analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
When the 11-S terrorist attack took place in the USA in 2001,
the West entered in a new era of continuous danger for its
lifestyle as well as its population. This event became a turning
point as it started a series of attacks perpetrated by extremists
groups on behalf the Islamic State [1].
One of the top priorities of the European Union is to protect
the fundamental rights of its citizens as well as to guarantee
their safety by fighting all kinds of terrorism. The European
Council sets a strategy for Counter-terrorism in 2005 based
on four premises: prevention, protection, pursuit and respond-
ing [2]. The European Council reworked this strategy in 2014,
producing measures and guidelines for the European member
states [3].
Although the new jihadist terrorism shares features with
other kinds of terrorism it has a distinctive nature that is who
radicalise its militants. It is necessary to research the unique
traits of jihadist terrorism to recognize the aforementioned
peculiarity as well as the different phases a person goes
through in order to become radicalised. This understand-
ing may provide relevant information to detect and inhibit
radicalisation. The continuous innovation in how the ter-
rorists commit their attacks, the magnitude of the violence
perpetrated and the psychological consequences for Western
citizens makes the counter-terrorism measures as well as the
prevention of radicalisation critical issues for governments
and counter-terrorism institutions [1].
Regarding jihadist radicalisation, there are many vulnera-
bility factors that make their militants suitable targets. These
factors are linked to socio-economic and demographic con-
ditions, as stated by the United Nations Office of Drugs
and Crime [4]. However, this explanation is very naive
(see [5], [6]). Note that there are around 1300 millions
Muslims practitioners all over the world who suffer from
the same social, economic and political problems as jihadists
and, surprisingly, the latter are not as large as it should be
expected. Moreover, just a small percentage of these Muslim
practitioners are in unison with this fanatic point of view.
In addition to the socio-demographic factors, radicalisa-
tion is triggered by feelings, basic needs, emotions as well
as by personal life situations and experiences. People usu-
ally start their radicalisation by reaching out radical indi-
viduals or groups and digging into extremist ideas when
they are seeking to fulfil the aforementioned needs. These
groups provide social recognition and feel of belonging,
which in turn promote the ingress to extremist networks
and active membership as well. Speaking about feelings
and emotion, guilt, indignation, anger, humiliation, frus-
tration and hatred are the most related ones to jihadist
radicalisation [7], [8].
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We will focus on these radicalisation factors, studying
them on the Internet. Radicalised individuals publish a lot of
information in public social media without any security mea-
sure, even though there are encryption tools and anonymity
software [4] that can be used to ’’hide’’ the content of the
information. This means that every user of the Social Media
can read the majority of the information published by the
radicalised individuals. Hence, Social Media is a perfect data
source for tracing radicalisation factors as we can access to
this plain information.
Social networks such as Tumblr, Instagram, Twitter,
Facebook and Youtube have become a powerful propaganda
tool for the jihadist cause as they serve as recruitment
assets, live forums, psychological warfare and sharing plat-
forms. Many youths have began to use social networks as
a new battleground for the Jihad [9], following the mes-
sage ‘‘any Muslim who tries the Jihad against the enemy
by electronic means is considered one way or another a
Mijahid’’ that was published on the Al-Fida and Shumukh
al-Islam forum. Moreover, terrorists use Internet to dissem-
inate their propaganda, which is supplemented with justifi-
cations, explanations, instructions, slideshows, images and
videos, just to cite a few [4]. In addition to social networks,
jihadists use other Internet services such as blogs, web pages,
forums, emails and peer to peer messaging applications [10].
Therefore, Social Media enable vulnerable individuals to
reach radicalised people and even people with the same inqui-
etudes, who may be able to encourage each other’s radical
ideas, supporting the radicalisation process. Furthermore,
these networks promote international communications that
bring about feeling of being part of a transnational
movement [11], [12].
Self-radicalisation without social interaction is improba-
ble, thus supporting the importance of online connections.
Even in cases when the individual seemed to be alone in the
process of radicalisation, there were strong influences from
people that were already radicalised, or even members of
terrorist groups [13]. In some cases, however, the commu-
nication with them may be a result of chance [14].
This paper presents some results related to an European
Project called Risk-Track1 [15], whose main goal is the
development of a tracking tool based on social media for risk
assessment on radicalization. This project is focused on the
extraction of radicalization factors on social media and the
development of a detection tool. This work corresponds to
the first step in the development of a risk assessment tool
in Social Networks, and its goal is to define (and validate)
the different indicators that later can be used to identify
those members of a Social Network with high risk of being
radicalised.
The main contributions of this paper are the following: it
proposes five indicators and their corresponding metrics that
can be used tomeasure the online radicalisation assessment of
a given individual using public data from his social networks,
1http://risk-track.eu/en/
later an experimental evaluation of these indicators, using
a public dataset of tweets from several Twitter accounts of
pro-ISIS are carried out. Finally, a detailed analysis of the
relationships between these metrics are discussed.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II
contains an overview of Social Network Analysis; Section III
provides a description of the different radicalisation factors
taken into account in this work; A complete description of
the proposed model can be found in Section IV and the
description of the dataset used is provided in V; Finally,
the experimental results obtained in this work are analysed
in Section VI and the concluding remarks are explained in
Section VII.
II. BACKGROUNDS ON SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS
Social Network Analysis (SNA) is the process of extracting
knowledge from Social Network Data. The general process
of any SNA platform is composed of the following stages of
a pipeline:
1) Data Extraction from the Social Networks (SNs).
2) Data Preprocessing.
3) Data Representation.
4) Execution of one, or several, specific algorithm.
5) Results analysis.
Any SNAprocess starts with the extraction of SocialMedia
Data from the specific SN. This first step is required in order
to validate the SNA algorithm designed. This process can be
skipped if researchers acquire these data from previous own
data, or from an existing dataset available on the Internet.
Once the data have been gathered, it is needed to perform
some preprocessing. This process is required because typi-
cally, these data is not ready for being analysed by the SNA
algorithm. For this reason, data need to be processed to ensure
that the data can be used by the SNA algorithm. Some of the
most typical preprocessing task are the following:
• Aggregation is performed when two or more features
are combined into a new one.
• Discretization is used when a feature with continuous
values needs to be represented with discrete values.
• Normalization is required when the values of a specific
feature needs to be fixed between two upper and lower
bounds.
• Feature Selection represents the process of subsetting
the whole set of features, in such a way only those
features relevant to the problem are taken into account.
• Feature Extraction consists of transforming current
features to generate new ones.
• Sampling task consists of extracting a small random
subset of instances from the whole data to be processed.
The selection process should guarantee that the sample
is enough representative of the distribution that governs
the data, thereby ensuring that results obtained on the
sample are close to ones obtained on the whole dataset.
Once the data has been extracted and preprocessed,
researchers have to adapt the data to the best representation
for the specific algorithm that will perform the SNA task.
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FIGURE 1. a) This figure contains a Social Network composed of 10 users. The different users are
represented in the nodes of the graph, whereas the edges represent the different relations between
them. b) This figure shows the Ego Network for the coloured node from left SN.
When working with Social Media, the most classical way
to represent the data is using a graph. A graph is a structure
that can be defined as G = {V ,E} where V is the set of
nodes and E represents the edges of the graph. In the case of
social networks, the nodes of the graph represent the different
users of the SN, whereas the edges represent the different
connections between the users.
Nevertheless, due to the extremely large number of users
in Social Networks (SN) [16], researchers try to find reduced
representations of the SN to test their algorithms. One of
the most extended representations is the well-known Ego
Networks [17].
An Ego Network is a social network centered in a spe-
cific user called ’Ego’. This network also contains those
users connected to this Ego (called ’Alters’), and all the
relations between the alters. In any Social Network, there are
as many Ego Network as users belong to this SN (i.e. there
is one Ego Network per user). This concept is represented in
Figure 1, where a small SN composed of 10 users is shown in
Figure 1(a), and the corresponding EgoNetwork for a specific
user of this SN can be observed in Figure 1(b).
Ego Networks are used to evaluate the SN and the online
social relationships of a specific user. In this sense, Ego
Networks are typically used to perform Community Finding
tasks in order to find the different communities that compose
the contacts of the ’Ego’ user [17], [18].
Regarding Community Finding methods, there are three
different families of algorithms that can be used. The first
family is composed by those algorithms that use the different
properties, or topology, of the graph to perform the commu-
nity finding task. This is the case of the Clique Percolation
Method (CPM) [19]–[21] that generates the different com-
munities taking into account the connectivity among the dif-
ferent nodes that compose the communities. Other example
is Label Propagation [22], which uses the topology of the
network to propagate several labels that define the different
communities.
The second family of algorithms is composed of those
algorithms that detect the different communities by perform-
ing a hierarchical clustering. In this sense, it is possible to find
bottom-up algorithms (i.e. those that start considering that
each element of the dataset belongs to a single community,
FIGURE 2. Data preprocessing, cleaning and analysis to compute
indicators.
and then, iteratively, the different communities are merged
according to a specific measure). Examples of bottom-up
algorithms areClauset-Newman-Moore [23], [24] (based on
the Edge Betweenness algorithm [25], [26]), or theWalktrap
algorithm [27], [28] that it is based on the random walks
that connect the different communities. A different approach
within hierarchical clustering are the top-down algorithms. In
this case, the algorithms start with only one community that
contains all the elements and then, this community is divided
taking into account the existing edges or links [29]–[31].
Finally, the third family is composed of probabilistic, or
heuristic, approaches, like [32] and [33]. Where the different
elements are evaluated by a probabilistic model in order to
measure their membership to the different communities.
The proposed work consists of a step backwards to all
the aforementioned works. Indeed, our goal is to define the
different Online Radicalisation Factors that can be used to
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identify those users with high risks of being radicalised. Once
these users have been identified, it is possible to build their
corresponding Ego Network, and finally analyse the different
communities that compose their social network.
III. RADICALISATION FACTORS
As it was mentioned in previous section, the goal of this paper
is to define the different indicators that highlight those Social
Network users with high risk of being radicalised.
Indicators provide information extracted from the current
situation where the individual is involved. As these indicators
can launch a process where the selected individual may be
investigated, it is extremely important to define correctly
these indicators.
In this work, we rely on a list of indicators provided by
several expert psychologists on radicalisation that are used
to measure the radicalisation level of any individual. Note
that there are a a huge number of indicators that can be
used. For example, Tahir Mahmood has already identified
more than 110 indicators extracted from biographies, videos,
interviews and information of over 2000 radicalised persons
in the world [34].
Nevertheless, as this paper is focused on the usage of
Social Media, we will take into account only those indicators
that can be measured by the activity of the target users in
the Social Networks. We consider five indicators (showed
in Fig. 2) and group them in two categories, attitudes and
beliefs towards Muslim religion and Western society, and
personality and interpersonal relationships, as grouped by
the experts on radicalisation. The former are indicators that
are measured by the content of the tweets, whereas the later
contains those indicators related to the writing style specific
for each user. We hereafter describe these indicators:
• Personality related Indicators:
I1 The individual is frustrated.
I2 The individual is introverted.
• Attitudes and beliefs related Indicators:
I3 Perception of discrimination for being Muslim.
I4 Expressing negative ideas about Western society.
I5 Expressing positive ideas about jihadism.
The first indicator (I1) tries to determine whether the user
is frustrated. Although this indicator can be determined if the
individual is easily irritated, or whether the individual has
negative reactions, to measure this indicator in SNs we will
take into account some aspects such as the capitalization of
the words, or the usage of words with negative content and
swearwords.
The goal of the second indicator (I2) is to determine
whether we are dealing with an introverted user or not. Sev-
eral studies reveal that introvert users have higher risk of
being radicalised. This goal can be computed using the length
of the sentences and the usages of ellipses in the tweets.
The third indicator (I3) is related to the feeling of being
discriminated just because for beingMuslim. This perception
can be expressed in the content of the tweets, specially if
the individual uses some keywords such as ’’hate’’, ’’sick’’,
’’Muslim’’, etc.
The fourth indicator (I4) is their hate to the Western soci-
ety. This feature can be clearly stated by writing tweets that
contain negative ideas about the Western society. Some key-
words that can be used are ’’Western’’, ’’hate’’,’’people’’,. . . .
Besides their hate about theWestern society, radical people
show a deep love for jihadism (I5). This feeling can be
observed in those tweets or sentences that provide positive
ideas about the mujahideen (i.e. people engaged in Jihad), or
their will to restore the Caliphate. This fifth indicator can be
analysed taking into account some keywords like ‘‘Islamic
State’’, ‘‘Caliphate’’, or ‘‘mujahid’’.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED MODEL
In order to validate the radicalisation indicators presented in
Section III, we propose a knowledge extraction model capa-
ble of performing a quantitative analysis about written text
in social networks. Our proposal uses features from diverse
research field such as Natural Language Processing, Data
Mining and Statistics. As was shown in Section II, the model
consists of various stages through which the texts obtained
from Social Networks are processed and analysed.
In the data acquisition stage, the data gathered from the
social network (i.e. the posts, tweets and/or status updates) is
grouped by the user that posted them. This is a straightfor-
ward step that relies solely on the data structure, or storage
technology, used when the social network was mined. Next,
there is a cleaning step, that is part of the pre-processing stage,
to remove the URL’s as well as the mention to other users
using regular expressions, as this kind of information is out
of the scope of the present work and also it could distort the
results of the following stages.
During the data representation stage, the messages are
divided into sentences because some indicators are based on
this unit of language. This task is performed by a sentence
tokenizer, that is, a method that divides the text into sentences
according to the punctuation marks and new lines it found in
the text.
Once the text is divided into sentences it is possible to
compute a measurement of the indicator related to the intro-
version of the individual (I2), as this indicator is based on
features found at the sentences such as: the use of ellipsis,
or the number of words in it (see Section III for a further
description). Another feature that might be extracted from
sentences is the use of capitalized words associated with
frustration (I2).
The rest of the indicators (I3, I4, I5) are based on the words
used to create the sentence. To measure these indicators it is
necessary an additional step to divide each sentence into the
different words. As the indicators are computed by counting
combined occurrences of some keywords related to the indi-
cator, we decided to broaden the search in two different ways.
Firstly, expanding the set of keywords with their synonyms.
And secondly, by looking for combined occurrences of the
stem of the words. This process is generally known as stem-
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ming, and it avoids unwanted situations as not counting as an
occurrence the word and its plural form and considering, for
instance, ‘fished’ and ‘fish’ as distinct terms. In other words,
if two terms share their stem they are considered the same.
Once data is processed and transformed, the indicators can
be computed according to the following methodology:
I1: Frustration relates to the use of swear words as well
as sentences with a negative connotation. To compute
these metrics (note that an indicator may have several
associatedmetrics), it is necessary to count the frequen-
cies of swear and negative words and normalize them in
a similar way as the other indicators. Furthermore, there
is an additional feature that might relate to frustration:
capitalization in words, that is, words written with all
their letters in upper case. To measure this, the model
computes the average number of capitalized words per
sentence which is also normalized.
I2: Introversion is related to the length of the sentences
(usually are short sentences) and the use of ellipses.
To measure this indicator the model counts the average
sentence length (in number of words) for every user
as well as the number of ellipses in his/her tweets,
searching sequences of at least three points in the tweet.
The value is normalized dividing it between the maxi-
mum value obtained to get an indicator within the range
[0.0, 1.0].
I3, I4, I5: These indicators are related to a set of keywords
that express the perception of being discriminated for
being Muslim, negative ideas about Western Society
and positive ideas about jihadism, respectively. In order
to give a numerical value, the model counts how many
times there are at least two of the keywords in a sen-
tence (see Table 1 to check the keywords). As with I2,
values are normalized.
TABLE 1. Initial keywords that are then expanded with synonyms from
Wordnet and stemmed.
V. EXPERIMENTAL DATASET
It is really difficult to find open datasets related to terrorism,
homeland security and radicalisation. In this case, we down-
load a dataset from Kaggle2 with over 17000 tweets from
2https://www.kaggle.com/kzaman/how-isis-uses-twitter
several Twitter accounts of pro-ISIS since the Paris attacks
in November 2015. Data were gathered and processed by a
digital agency called Fifth Tribe, and it is released under the
CC0: Public Domain License.
As stated before, the dataset has about 17000 observations
and 8 features, namely: name, user name, description of the
account, user’s location where one can put on their Twitter
profile, number of followers, number of tweets, date and
time when the tweet was posted, and the text itself. Regard-
ing accounts, there are 112 unique user names. There is an
interesting observation: there are only 78 unique descriptions
among these 112 users, which may suggests that some of
the accounts belong to the same person. Using langid, a pre-
trained language identification tool written in Python [35],
we found that most of the tweets (14556 out of 17410) were
written in English, followed by 742 and 610 tweets written in
Arabic and French, respectively.
FIGURE 3. Distribution of the number of tweets and followers per user.
As shown in Figure 3, most of the users in the dataset have
posted less than 300 tweets. In fact, there are some users with
less than 10 published tweets, which is a surprisingly small
quantity of information for a user to be tagged as pro-ISIS as
the description of the dataset stated. On the other hand, there
are some accounts with a high number of tweets that defines
themselves as ’war reporters’. The same thing happens with
the number of followers that each user has, whose distribu-
tion is heavily left-skewed, with most users having less than
1000 followers and a unique user (@RamiAlLolah) with
over 30000.
According to the timestamps of the tweets in the dataset,
they were published between 6th January, 2015 and 13 May,
2016, that is roughly a half and a year. Although the day of the
month when the tweets were published are rather chaotic and
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FIGURE 4. Day and hour of publication of the tweets.
without a clear tendency (see Figure 4), there is an interesting
trend in the hour of publication: most of the tweets were
published in the afternoon and evening. This observation
might be a result of the work timetable, it is easier to publish
a tweet when you are not at work.
FIGURE 5. Most frequent terms found in the tweets from Kaggle dataset.
In order to identify the main ideas expressed in the written
text of the tweets, we computed the word cloud that is shown
in Figure 5. To generate the word cloud we treat all the tweets
as an unique written text and then, as the previously defined
model do, URL’s and non alphanumeric words are removed.
After this, we ran a text feature extraction method called TF-
IDF (Term Frequency - Inverse Document-Frequency) [36]
that analyses sequences of consecutive words (i.e. n-grams)
and computes their weighted frequencies, so it is possible
to use this information to find out which terms are the most
important within the text. In our case, the word cloud has been
computed with the top 50 terms obtained from the feature
extraction method.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We implemented the model described in Section IV, using
Python and R, and then processed the dataset in order to
obtain the indicators and analyse common characteristics
of users, similarities in the values of indicators, as well as
correlation between metrics. As seen in Figure 6, the values
of the variables are distributed on the lower zone of the range
of possible values [0.0, 0.1], with some outliers in the mid-
range as well as high values in the case of Swearing and
Negative Words. This highlights the fact that there is a high
number of users with similar values of the indicators, and
a few users whose indicators are far away from the former,
as it happens with other metrics of the dataset, such as the
number of published tweets and followers (see Section V).
Moreover, this result permits us identify common behaviour
patterns that would support radicalised user identification in
other datasets. It is worthy to emphasize the higher variability
in the values of swearing and negative words compared to this
variability in the other variables.
FIGURE 6. Boxplots describing the different variables computed by the
model for the whole Kaggle dataset.
In order to find out possible relationships between the
metrics, we analysed the pairwise correlation between them
(see Figure 7). A noteworthy result obtained from this anal-
ysis is the lack of correlation between the average sentence
length and the rest of the variables, even when this cor-
relation is generally high between the latter. In fact, we
found strong correlations between expressing positive ideas
about Jihadism and both the perception of discrimination
(ρ = 0.831, p-value < 2.2e−16) and the use of swear
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FIGURE 7. Generalized pairs plot of the indicators. The diagonal represents the density plot of the variables. The upper diagonal shows both, the
correlation and the Pearson’s correlation coefficient, for each pair of indicators, whereas the lower diagonal represents the scatterplot, and a linear
regression model, for those pairs as well (shaded area displays the confidence interval around the model).
words (ρ = 0.857, p-value < 2.2e−16) as well as the
use of negative words (ρ = 0.813, p-value < 2.2e−16).
Correspondingly, the linear models computed for the average
sentence length against the rest of the metrics do not adjust
well to the observations. This situation may happen due to the
limit of characters that the social network Twitter sets to the
length of the messages, which are limited to 140 characters
without counting URL’s. With this limitation in mind it is
complicated to extract behaviour information from the aver-
age number of words in a sentence, theymust be short in order
to express enough information without surpassing the limit
of characters. The metric should be useful in other context,
though, when there is no limit to the number of characters of
a message (Facebook, Tumblr, . . . ).
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Nowadays, Social Networks (SN) such as Tumblr,
Instagram, Twitter, Facebook and Youtube have become a
powerful propaganda tool for the jihadist cause as they serve
as recruitment assets, live forums, psychological warfare
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and sharing platforms. Many youths have began to use
social networks as a new battleground for the Jihad, follow-
ing the message ‘‘any Muslim who tries the Jihad against
the enemy by electronic means is considered one way or
another a Mijahid’’ that was published on the Al-Fida and
Shumukh al-Islam forum. Moreover, terrorists use Internet
to disseminate their propaganda, which is supplemented with
justifications, explanations, instructions, slideshows, images
and videos, just to name a few. In addition to social networks,
jihadists use other Internet services such as blogs, web pages,
forums, emails and peer to peer messaging applications.
Therefore, Social Media let vulnerable individuals to reach
radicalised people and even peoplewith the same inquietudes,
who may be able to encourage each other’s radical ideas,
supporting the radicalisation process.
This paper defines different indicators that can be used
to measure the online radicalisation assessment of a given
individual. In this sense, 5 different indicators have been
defined related to the attitudes and beliefs towards Muslim
religion and Western society and personality and interper-
sonal relationships. It is important to take into account that
this list of indicators can be extended with any other indicator
that can bemeasured using the information extracted from the
social networks.
For the experimental phase, we have measured these
indicators using a dataset found in Kaggle3 with over
17000 tweets from several Twitter accounts of pro-ISIS since
the Paris attacks in November 2015. Data were gathered and
processed by a digital agency called Fifth Tribe, and it is
released under the CC0: Public Domain License.
The first analysis of the indicators reveals that values are
distributed on the lower zone of the range of possible values
[0.0, 0.1], with some outliers in the mid-range as well as
high values in the case of Swearing and Negative Words.
This highlights the fact that there is a high number of users
with similar values of the indicators and a few users whose
indicators are far away from the former.
Also, we have analysed the pairwise correlation between
the different indicators. In general, there are strong corre-
lations between the majority of indicators defined in this
work: expressing positive ideas about Jihadism, the percep-
tion of discrimination, the use of swear words, and the use
of negative words. Nevertheless, we have observed a lack of
correlation between the average sentence length and the rest
of indicators. This situation may happen due to the limit of
characters that the social network Twitter sets to the length
of the messages, which are limited to 140 characters without
counting URL’s. The conclusion that can be drawn from the
analysis of these correlations is that it makes sense to measure
the indicators with the selected metrics as they share a similar
behaviour so people in risk of radicalisation should score high
on these metrics; and also, that the dataset used is coherent.
This paper supposes an important step in the fight against
radicalisation because it defines several indicators that can
3https://www.kaggle.com/kzaman/how-isis-uses-twitter
be used to measure the risk of radicalisation of a given
individual. Once this individual has been identified, different
actions can be performed in order to avoid this individual
become a Jihadist. From the computational science point of
view, one of this actions could be the analysis of his/her online
friendships to identify those communities that influence the
user to became a mujahideen.
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